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RESUMEN 
En este artículo argumentamos que Ming China desempeñó un papel fundamental 
en el auge y decadencia del Imperio español. La demanda china de plata permitió ele-
vados beneficios hasta 1640. El descenso de estos beneficios llevó a la reducción de la 
producción y la Monarquía se enfrentó a una grave crisis financiera. La consecuencia 
fue una presión fiscal creciente con objeto de compensar la pérdida de los ingresos ex-
temos procedentes de América. 
ABSTRACT 
In this article we argüe that Ming China had a fundamental impact on the rise and 
decline of the Spanish Empire. China's demand for silver was of such magnitude that 
prívate mining profíts in the Spanish Empire remained high until about 1640. The de-
cline of these profíts led to abandon ptóduction. Spain faced a deepeníng línancial 
crisis due to the fall of silver's valué. The loss of purchasing power from the Crown's 
American enterprise was inevitable and the state's relendess pressure for increased tax-
ation within Castile and elsewhere was mandatory in order to compénsate for lost ex-
temal purchasing power. 
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N A N D OVERVIEW ' 
One cannot help but marvel that a relatively small country such as Spain, 
with half the population of France, could have risen to become the West's 
' This essay benefits from many uscful criticisms and suggestions by John M. Headley, Akira 
Motomura, Mark Steele, Peter Temin and an anonymous referee, the authors are nonelhcless 
Rniilíi Jf Hnítiria licortómicj 
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dominant power in thc sixtcenth century, her ignominious collapse during the 
first half of the seventeenth century notwithstanding. The decline of the Span-
ish Empire was certainly visible to all by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. No 
one denles that both the flowering and decay of the Spanish Empire had im-
mense impacts on European history, of course, but the extent to which the 
foundation of Spain's Empire was rooted in the emergence of powerful global 
—not just European and American— economic forces has not been fully ap-
preciated. 
Scholars have long speculated about how relatively-undcrdeveloped 
Spain could have managed to finance such a worldwide commercial and 
military enterprise for a century. Some have argued —and we agree— that 
elucidation of the financia! basis of Spain's rise might shed light on the Em-
pire's fiscal decline as well. There has been disagreement, however, about 
which aspects of the Empire's financial foundation warrant what relative em-
phasis. Elliott (1961), has pointcd out that taxes levied within Castile com-
prised perhaps 70 per cent of total Crown revenues; some interpret this 
figure to imply that Imperial finances were mostly dependent upon domestic 
resources. And there is no question that domestic taxation was onerous for 
the average Spaniard: The «population of C^astile was taxed more heavily 
than any other people in Europe...by 1590 one-third of the average peasant's 
income in a good year was consumed in tax» .^ Moreover, evidence suggests 
that increasingly onerous taxation plagued Spanish peasants throughout the 
period of Imperial rise and decline '. Thus, some scholars tend to place con-
siderable weight on domestic sources of economic support for the Empire 
(although admitting that external/foreign factors were also important). Others 
maintain that externa!, international factors should receive the heavier weight 
in terms of financing the Spanish Empire •*. In other words, there is fun-
damental disagreement in the literature as to the extent to which domestic or 
international factors deserve emphasis in explaining the emergence and de-
cline of Imperial Spain. 
The attempted contribution of this essay is to add a new wrinkle to the ex-
lernal/international side of the debate: Namely, to suggest that Ming China 
heavily influenced the direction of Spanish, and indeed world, history. Spain's 
solely responsible for its arguments and remaining errors. A versión ot ihis fiapcr was prcscntcd 
at the Fiftyfifth annual meeting of the Economic History Amoniction in Chicago. 
^ Parker (1979), p. 188. 
' Sce Vun (1987, pp. 276-280) lor a receñí example involving Tierra de ("ampos. 
' The classic «exiernal» argumenl is Hainilton (1957), of course, but Flynn (1982), Kamen 
(1978), and others adopt approaches diflerent from Hamiiton. 
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domestic economy and her Empire were both intimately intertwined, not just 
with the economies of America and other European nations, but with the 
emergence of trade at the global level. 
fllt is necessar\' to continué along the lines that start from supra-regional 
analytical concepts, such as urban networks, and move out towards the scarcely 
considered issue of the external connections of the Spanish economy starting 
from the influence of changcs taking place at the global level, a question which 
has been scarcely looked into '. 
Specifically, we argüe that the emergence of a new monetary and fiscal 
regime within Ming China was the driving forcé behind global trade in the 
early-modern period. Moreovcr, the rise and fall of the Spanish Empire is best 
viewed in the context of a Sino-centered world economy ''. 
II. GLOBAL SILVER: I N D E P E N D E N ! M O N E Y 
OR MONETARY-AGGREGATE SUBSET? 
Those of US trained first as economists, and secondarily as historians, 
usually claim that proper application of modern economic theor>' clarifies im-
portant historical issues. Today's best theory is used to interpret past events; 
that is, the latest theory logically precedes application to a particular historical 
phenomenon. The very existence of economic history as a field in large part 
depends upon this canon —theory first, historical applicauon second— a 
recipe which has indeed led to many advances in historical understanding. But 
things do not always work out so neady. A central contention of this essay is 
that the general methodology of today's monetary theory has unintentionally 
obfuscated the role of precious metáis in the early-modern world economy. 
Because of mainstream monetary theory's incompatibility with events of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we have in fact been forccd to devise an 
alternative theoretical framework '. 
One of the main sources of confusión in the literature emerges at the level 
of conventional definitions of the term «money». Monetary theorists today, of 
' Yun(1994), p. }17. i f i 
" Por a non-technical overvicw of global trade from the vantage of the world supply ot and 
demand lorsilver.see Flvnn and Giráldezí 1995a). j i u u A 
• See Doherty and I^lynn (19891 for a more complete explanation ol the model which under-
lics this essay (indeed, all of our workl. 
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course, are engaged in a continuing dialogue regaíding what is best included/ 
excluded from definitions of particular monetary aggregates. Without entering 
directly into macroeconomic debates about «monetary aggregates» at this 
time, we wish to simply point out that virtually all monetary theorists today 
would probably agree that gold coins, silver coins, and copper coins should 
be considered components of even the most restrictive defínition of the 
«money supply» in the context of sixteenth-and seventeenth-century com-
merce. All metal coins are labeled «cash», itself a subset of today's most re-
strictive defínition of money (Mi). When confronting the actual historical rec-
ord of intercontinental trade in the early-modern period, however, even this 
practice of conceptual aggregation at the sub-level «cash» creates confusión. 
In particular, application of the abstract concept «money» —as an aggregate— 
has led to misinterpretation of the cause of treasure flows out of Europe and 
into Asia. 
Convention says that treasure had to flow from Europe to Asia as a re-
sult of Europe's trade déficit vis a vis Asia *•. It seems that Europeans bc-
came enamored with Asian products —such as silks, spices and ceramics— 
while Asian demand for European products languished. Dynamic European 
imports of Asian products, coupled with meager Asian imports of European 
products, implied an overall European trade déficit with the Far East. Main-
tenance of Europe's Asian trade déficit required that precious metáis flow to 
Asia from Europe, as a balancing item. Europe's export of precious metáis is 
thus perceived as an effcct, an unavoidable response in compensation for 
Europe's trade déficit (the root cause). In economics terminology, the cause 
of the imbalance emanated from the «real-sector»; the flow of precious me-
táis from Europe to Asia was a «monetary-sector» effect. Note that dynam-
ism in this picture emanates from demand-side forces within Europe; Euro-
peans were the ones who were receptive to wares from strange lands. 
Europeans were open and adventuresome. Asian proclivities were insular 
and static. European dynamics caused a trade déficit with Asia. Precious 
metáis flowed eastward in compensating response to Europe's trade déficit 
with Asia ''. 
" For a more complete treatment of the issucs discussed in the next few paragraphs, see 
Flynn{1986). 
'' Kindiebergcr (1989, pp. 7, 35, 38, 48, 64, 69, 79) considcrs the retrograde Asian proclivity 
«hoarding» (of precious metalsl to be a sign of Asian backwardness; he argües that Spanish Ame-
rican treasure ventured to Asia in order to satisf\' the Eastern propensity to hoard. A notable ad-
vantage of Kindleberger's thesis is that he at ieast rejecls the conventional tradedeficit (specie-
flow) hypothesis, but it is not clear that Kindleberger's alternative explanation represents an 
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A cióse look at the historical record reveáis contradictions within the 
trade-deficit scenario just outlined. «Precious metáis» did not in fact flow from 
Europe to Asia, although tens of thousands of tons of the specific metal «sil-
ver» did flow through Europe and eventually into China. Rarely taken into 
considcration, however, is the fact that while prodigious quantities of silver 
flowed easrward out of Europe, between 1550 and 1650 significant quantities 
of gold were simultaneousiy shipped from China into Europe (as well as into 
Japan and America) "J. 
So Italy stood at the crossroads where the south-north axis maintained by 
Spanish policy and the Genoesc asientos mct the east-wcst axis running to the 
Levant and the Far East, where the golden road from Gcnoa to Antwcrp met 
the silver road to the east ". 
A Spanish official who servcd for three decades in the East Indies, Pedro 
de Baeza, actively promoted the trade of Chínese gold for silver from New 
Spain or Castilc, writing in a treatisc publishcd in 1609 that «a profit of 75 or 
89 per cent would be made» by concentrating on gold purchases. It is ironic 
that a huge volume of Asian copper flowed through Amsterdam to some of 
Europe's biggest customers —European mints— on some of the same ships 
that carried Spanish American silver to the East. During the peak years 1672-
75, Dutch imports of Japanese copper equalled perhaps half of the calculated 
Swedish exports at that time '2, In summary, one specific type of monetary 
substance (silver) flowed Eastward in exchange for two other money substan-
ces (gold, then copper) which flowed in the opposite direction (into Europe). 
What sense does it make to aggregate items into a single category —labeled 
«money» or «precious metáis»— when wc know that prodigious quantities of 
the individual components comprising this category were bartered against 
each other for more than a century? The answer is that conceptual combina-
overall improvement. See FIynn (1990, pp. 721-724) for criticism of Kindiebcrger's pejorative usa-
ge of the notion «hoarding». 
'" Contemporaries were completclv awarc of the swap of silver for Chínese gold, an exampjc 
"f which is containcd in the following citaiion by von Glahn (forthcoming, Chapter 4, p. 217): 
«According to the testimonv of a lapanese envoy at Macao, rccorded in a Jesuit work published 
there in 1590, great quantities of gold flowed out of China to Japan and other overseas markets». 
Flynn (1986, pp. 39-42) discusses the exchange of European silver for Chínese gold between 
1^50 and 1650 in an article which offers thcoretical suppori for the Rícardo-style argument oi 
(.haudhuri (1978, pp. 156-177; 1986), who used dívergent bimetallíc ratios to explain the mterna-
lional flows of specific metáis. 
" Brandel(1972), p. 499. 
'^  C;iamann (1981). p 174. 
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tion of gold, silver, and copper obfuscates the rationale behind the export/im-
port of individual metáis. In addition, the practice of aggregating metáis with 
such dissimilar histories has unintentionally precluded discovery of the under-
lying basis for East-West trade in the sixteenth and scventeenth centuries. 
Understanding intercontinental trade during this period requires a micro-
economic (as opposed to macroeconomic) approach to precious metáis history. 
Each metal must be analyzed in terms of its own specific demand and supply 
conditions; which is to say, microeconomic analysis is required '*. The central 
demand-sidc question is: Why did the specific commodity, silver, out of a 
multitude of potentially exportable products, dominate the eastward leg of 
Western trade with Asia during the early-modern period? The answer has 
been accessible in the literature on the monetary and fiscal histor\' of Ming 
China '•*, but recognition of demand-side dynamics requires re-conceptualiza-
tion of China's silver history in the context of global economic developments. 
A global perspective reveáis two dominant regions of silver production, 
Spanish America and Japan. Conservative, offícial estimates indícate that Span-
ish America (México and Perú) alone produced about 150,000 tons of silver 
between 1500 and 1800 ", perhaps exceeding 80 per cent of the entire world's 
production over that time span "•. Despite America's dominance in silver pro-
duction over three centuries, Japan may have been the primary exponer of sil-
ver to China during the late-sixteenth and eariy-seventeenth century period, 
shipping perhaps 200 tons per year at times, but falling off dramatically in the 
second half of the seventeenth century '". Since all of the great silver mines in 
both hemispheres ultimately sold to the Chínese marketplace, ít ís natural to 
ask why China persistently absorbed tens of thousands of tons of silver from 
throughout the world over the entire early-modern period? 
" It is not possiblc to apply standard microeconomic demand-supply analysis to our pro-
blem, however, because «inventory supply» and «invcntory demand» are required in this case 
(rather than «production supply» and «consumption demand»). For mathematical derivation of 
the inventory demand function underlying the graphical presentation of this essay, see the appen-
dix in Doherty and FIynn (1989). 
'^  Discussion of the conversión of Chinese monetary and fiscal systems to silver can be 
found in AtweII (1977, p. 4; 1982, pp. 79, 83), Boxer (1970, p. 461), Chuan (1969, p. 2), Fairbank 
(1992, p. 135), Gernet (1982, p. 415), Hamashita (1988, pp. 18, 23). For an outstanding account 
of Chinese monetary history (including a hundred pages on the history of monetary thought in 
China), see von Glahn (forthcoming). 
i> Barrett(1990), p. 237. 
"• Cross(1983), p. 397. 
' ' According to the calculations ol Barrett (1990, p. 225), Japan may have produced about 
30 % of the world's silver in the sixteenth century and around 16 % in the seventeenth century; 
also Innes (1980), chapter VI. 
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There is no motivation to produce a commodity, of course, in the absence 
of customers willing to buy it. By far the world's dominant end-customer tor 
silver was China, yet the almost total neglect of China's pivotal role on the de-
mand side of the world silver market is perhaps the most striking featurc of 
the litcrature "*. An extensive paper-money system existed in China by the 
l l th century, half a millennium ahead of similar developments in Europe. As 
has happened so many times throughout Chínese history '"^  and elsewhere, 
Ming rulers succumbed to the temptation to finance government projects via 
excess issuance of paper monies: As a result, a promissory note with a nominal 
valué of one liang (one thousand copper coins) fell to less than one-thousandth 
of a liang (less than one copper coin) by the ycar 1445 "^. Military expenses 
constituted perhaps the most persistent drain on Ming revenues, but projects 
such as the movement of the capital to Beijing and geographical expeditions 
were also expensive. What cheaper short-run solution than to simply print 
paper money? 
Unchecked issuance of paper money led to hyper-inflation and the valué 
of Chínese paper money fell (predictably) toward its cost of production; in 
other words, it became nearly worthless. China's paper-money system had col-
lapsed totally by the middle of the fifteenth century ^i. Business communities 
cannot function efficiently without a relatively stable monetary standard, of 
course, and Chínese merchants came to choose silver as the de fado monetary 
standard. «Silverization» of the monetary system slowly spread from the vi-
brant coastal trading áreas of South China to the rest of the Ming Empire. 
Over time, the bulk of the merchant-sector portion of China's monetary sys-
tem converted to a silver standard. Copper-based monies continued in use for 
everyday purchases by common people, but business transactions evolved to-
ward payment in silver. It is of major significance that, concurrent with the sil-
verization of it's monetary system, China's fiscal system also gradually con-
verted to a silver standard. At first local, then regional government entities 
began specifying that taxes be paid in silver. The Ming Dynasty initially re-
sisted both the monetary and the fiscal «silverization» of China, but as it be-
'" Atwell (1977; 1982; 1986; 1988) has long emphasized the substantial effect of American sil-
ver on the Chinese economv. Flynn and Giráldez (1994; 1995a) offer the compiementary argu 
ment that Chinese demand for silver caused the birth of both Pacific Rim trade and world trade 
in 1571. 
'•' «Confronted with the exorbitant cosls of maintaining huge standing armies, the [twelfth-
cemury] Southern Song government turned to paper currency as an expedient alternative to coi 
nage.» (von Glahn, 1996, forthcoming, p. 80). 
'" Gernet(1982), p. 415. 
" Yang 11952), p. 67. 
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carne increasingly clear that the silver movement could not be stopped, resis-
tance by the central authority waned. Over time, more and more Ming taxes 
were commuted to silver payments. Silverization of the Ming fiscal system cul-
minated in the so-called «Single-Whip Tax Reform» dating from the 1570s, 
«the most signifícant innovation in fiscal policy during the entire Ming and 
Qing periods» ^^. The Single-Whip consolidated scores of previously inde-
penden! taxes inte a single levy; moreover, this single tax was payable exclu-
sively in silver, even for peasants. Since China contained an estimated one-
quarter of vi'orld population (well over 100 million people), conversión of its 
monetary and fiscal system to a silver standard was bound to have a global im-
pact of historie proportions. If we combine China with numerous tributary 
States participating in this silver movement, perhaps one-third or even 40 per 
cent of the world's populace had converted to a silver monetary-and-fiscal 
foundation ^': 
To sum up, the entire tribute and interregional trade zone had its own 
structural rules which excrcised a systematic control through silver circulation 
and with the Chincsc tribute at the center. This system, encompassing East and 
Southcast Asia was articulated with neighboring tradc zones like those of India, 
the Islamic región and Europe. 
The payment of tribute in silver implied that the major trading routes of 
Asia were heavily impacted by the flow of bullion toward Beijing. In the case 
of Korcan tribute, for example, [apáñese silver exports via Tsushima and 
Korea matched chronologically with the schedule of tribute payments from 
Korea to imperial China •^*. 
Not surprisingly, such a massive shift in the demand for silver caused its 
valué to soar. Using bimetallic ratios as an indicator, silver's valué within 
China jumped to about double the levéis prevalent in America, Japan, Europe, 
and much of the rest of the world ^': 
•!• Moloughney and Xia (1989), p. 55; for the Single Whip, st-t Liang (1970); Huang (1974), 
provides a more detailed account. It look a long time to fully implement the singie-whip tax re-
torm. Ming treasury income rose from 2.3 million taels of silver in 1570, to 4.4 million taels in 
1577. to 6 million taels in 1618, about 9 million in 1630, 12.2 million in 1631, 20 million in 1639, 
and 23 million in 1642: «This continual increase is in part a retleciion of the shift from a grain 
tax to a silver tax with the gradual implementation ol ihc Single Whip Retorms.» (Moloughney 
andXia(1989), p. 67.) 
" Hamashita(1988), p. 18. 
•^i Tashiro (1989),/idíí/w. 
^' Chuan (1969, p. 2) ofters a direct comparison between China and Spain: «From 1592 to the 
early 17th ccntury gold u'as exchanged for silver in ('anión at the rate ol 1:5.5 to 1:7, whilc in 
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The gold/silvcr ratio in China had drifted sHghtly downward from its his-
torical peak of l;4-5, achieved in the late 14th century, to 1:6 by the early six-
tecnth century.. In contrast, the gold/silver ratio hovered around 1:11-12 in Eu-
rope, 1:10 in Persia, and 1:8 in India, (von Glahn, forthcoming, Chapter 4, 
p. 214.) 
Since silver was durable and had a relatively high value-to-weight ratio, 
the divergen! valué of silver in China vis-a-vis the rest of the world created 
enormous opportunities for profitable trade. Here was a classic case of arbi-
trage opportunity: One had merely to purchase in markets where silver was 
cheap (e.g México City, Amsterdam, Nagasaki) and sel! it in markets offering a 
higher price. Since China offered double the rest-of-the-world price for silver, 
the white metal gravitated ineluctabiy to that región of the globe. Figure 1 de-
picts silver's divergent valué in China compared with the rest of the world. 
China was such a giant «vacuum cleaner» or «suction pump» for silver 
ihomba aspirante), in Godinho's colorful terms, that it took the importation of 
many tens of thousands of tons of Japanese and American silver into China for 
about a century in order to finally depress silver's market valué in China down 
to the level prevalent in the rest of the world (thereby also eliminating silver-
gold arbitrage profits). It seems that the main arbitrage phase of the silver trade 
ended around 1640, by which time bimetallic ratios around the world had 
converged ^^ Figure 2 represents the augmented silver stocks of China and the 
rest of the world around 1640. The Chínese economy continued to attract sig-
niHcant (but reduced) quantities of silver during the second half of the seven-
teenth century, during what might be characterized the «non-arbitrage phase» 
or this silver trade '^. China remained a major player in world trade during the 
•ater, non-arbitrage phase, but its global impact during the post-1640 phase 
was not as dominant as it had been during the pre-1640 arbitrage phase. 
^pain the exchange rate was 1:12.5 to 1:14, thus indicating that the valué of silver was twice as 
n'gh in China as in Spain.» Richard von Glahn (forthcoming, Chapter 4, p. 218) cites Pedro de 
Bacza's contemporary observations; «Describing the market at Cantón in the 1590s, he stated 
that goid commonly traded in China at a ratio of 1:5.5 with silver, and even whcn gold was most 
dcar the gold/silver ratio did not surpass 1:7.5, in contrast to the prevailing ratio of 1:12.5 in 
Spain.» 
For global convergence of bimetallic ratios see, for cxample. Atwcll (1982, p. 82), Kobata 
11965, pp. 254-55), Yamamura and Kamiki (1983, p. 352). 
'' The post-1640 non-arbitrage phase of the East-West silver trade is discussed in Flynn 
• 1991). It should be poimed out that an episode of arbitrage aróse once again in the late seven-
tecnth century, when disruptions of the coastal trade by the Qing caused ovcrvaluatlon of silver 
once again (as rcflected by divergent bimetallic ratios). (von Glahn, forthcoming) Even though 
episodes of divergent bimetallic ratios like this do occur after 1640, we find it convenient to 
thmk of the post-1640 portion of the sevcnteenth centur>' as a «non-arbitrage» phase overall. 
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Note the ironic cause-effect switch resulting from adoption of a micro-
economic approach to an individual money. Disequilibrium in the silver mar-
ket becomcs the cause of global trade. Precious metáis flows are no longer per-
ceived in terms of the passive, reactive role attributed by the traditional 
European trade-deficit interpretation. Moreover, the misleading practice of 
couching monetary flows in East-West terms is laid bare, unless somcone is 
prepared to assert that silver-producing Japan was already «westernized» prior 
to the beginning of the Tokugawa period (1600)! The traditional view places 
t-uropean spending habits at the causal forcfront —since excess European im-
ports are supposed to have provoked the trade déficit— while our interpreta-
tion relegates Europeans to the role of middlemen. The supply side of the 
world silver market was dominated by Spanish America and Japan. China 
dominated on the demand side. It is true that Europeans played an important 
role as mediators between the supply-sides (Japan and Spanish America) and 
Chma's end-market on the demand side, but this does not iustif\' elevation of 
c-uropeans to the status of prime movers '^'. 
The Pacific leg of silver's journey to China —via the Acapulco-Manila Gal-
leons— is also at odds with the traditional trade-deficit interpretation of world 
monetary flows. At least 50 metric tons of silver passed via Manila to China 
annually throughout the seventeenth century —approximately the same ton-
nage of silver shipped annually out of Europe by the Portuguese Estado do 
India, the English East India Company, and the Dutch East India Company 
combined '^*— yet as far as we know nobody is willing to argüe that America's 
voracious appetite for Asian products precipitated an American trade déficit 
with Asia, which in lurn necessitated a massive drain of American treasure 
ovcr the Pacific. ^X'hy would trade-deficit logic be applicable to the European 
leg of East-West trade, but not to the Pacific leg? Our utiiity-based micro-
economic argument, on the other hand, applies equally to all regions and par-
ties participating in the global trading system, a system itself driven by dise-
cóme claim that we over-empha.size Chínese demand for silver at the expense of silver de-
land within India. Reform of Mughal India's tax system in the late 16ih century also involved 
the «substitution of silver as the basic unit of demand and account» (Perlin. 1993, p. 1541, a sys-
em which spread southward through India during the seventeenth century; Chaudhuri (1986, p. 
also discusses the silverization of tax systems in India as well as China. The bimetallic ratios 
cited above (von Glahn, forthcoming, Ch. 4, p. 214) indicate that silver's market valué in China 
*as high relative to its valué in India, however, a trend which supports Chaudhuri's (1978, p. 
1) contcntion that India was a net exportcr of silver to China. On the other hand, our inient is 
not to deny that India may have been a major end-market for silver between 1550 and 1650. 
üwever, the evidence seems to indicate that Chínese demand for silver was more significant 
an that of India; otherwise, why was silver more valuable in China? 
FIynn and Giráldez (1994), p. 83. 
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quilibrium in the world silver market. Far from the passive-reactive role at-
tributed by the traditional trade-deficit argument, we view silver as a crucial 
driving forcé underlying the emergence of global trade '". 
Unlike conventional microeconomic demand and supply functions, the 
utility-based demand function in Figures 1 and 2 refer to inventory stocks, the 
quantities of silver people desire to hold at every price; vertical «stock supply» 
in the market represents the existing inventory stock of silver at a point in 
time. The reason it took so many generations for the valué of silver to ap-
proach equilibrium globally (up to around 1640) is that the mass of inventory 
stocks itself continued to grow. The filling of a swimming pool provides a use-
ful analogy: When the pool is nearly empty, the volume of water in the pool 
(the stock) can be doubled in minutes; when the pool is already half full, how-
ever, it may take hours (or even days at máximum flow) to double water stor-
age. In other words, the percentage impact of a given rate of water intake, 
other things equal, depends upon the initial volume of water storage. In the 
case of the silverization of China, tons of silver were imported on a continuing 
basis, yet the ever-growing silver stock was so large that these imports, al-
though large in absolute terms, comprised a decreasing percentage addition to 
existing stocks. China's silver stocks grew only gradually (in percentage terms) 
despite historie inflows of silver from both hemispheres. 
It is not widely recognized in the Western literature that China experi-
enced price inflation more or less comparable with the Price Revolution of 
Europe and the rest of the world, particularly after 1571 when massive vol-
umes of silver began to pour into China via Manila and Nagasaki ". Cartier 
explicitly States that his price calculations involved conversión of observed 
prices (expressed in terms of bronze coins) into «silver-content» prices; in 
other words, he used bronze-silver exchange rates within China to estímate 
what rice prices (actually recorded in terms of bronze coins) would have been 
if rice prices had been expressed in silver terms. The shipment of vast volumes 
of silver from around the globe depressed silver's valué, so naturally the 
Chínese had to surrender progressively more units of silver in exchange for 
'" Of course, producís exponed in exchange for silver deserve as much attention as silver it-
self Flynn and Giráldez (1996a) use estimates of Amerita-bound Chínese silk exports through 
Manila to supporl Chuan's (1969) contention that silver exports from Acapulco did not fall off 
during the seventeenth ccntury, as Chaunu (1960, p. 250) had claimed. America-bound silk ex-
ports maintained throughout the 17th century, at the same 2 million peso per year rate estimated 
by Chuan for the reciprocal China-bound silver galleons. Chaunu's estimates were based on offi-
cial almojarifazgo tax records, which ignored (by definition) the increasingly dominant method of 
exporting American silver —smuggling. 
" Cartier(1981).pp. 454-66. 
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rice and other products; this is, of course, the defínition oí (silver-content) price 
inflation ". Price trends would havc looked entirely different had Cartier instead 
elected to convert Chínese rice prices into, say, gold-content, copper-content, 
lead-content, or cowrie-based prices. Silver-content price inflation was a global 
phenomenon in the early-modern period, in other words, but when prices deno-
minated in non-silver terms are under scrutiny, trends in such non-silver prices 
depended upon supply and demand conditions for whatever particular substan-
ce(s) comprised the intrinsic content of the specific money in question. 
ni . SILVER PROFITS AND THE SPANISH EMPIRE 
The domestic backwardness of early-modern Spain —«closer in many ways 
to that of an Eastcrn European state like Poland, exporting raw materials and 
•rnporting luxury products, than to econoinies of West European states» "— 
renders its imperial global achievements all the more fascinating. With a domes-
tic economy clearly incapable of financing the sprawling Iberian Empire, the al-
ternative is to look beyond domestic borders for an external financial founda-
tion: «Early modern Spain did not have a unified economy, and the most useful 
way in which we can try to understand its evolution is to recognize that it was a 
backward country with poor resources, dependent on external markets and ex-
ternal supplies» ^\ The Spanish American silver mining industry was a crucial 
component of the fiscal foundation of Empire: Spanish imperialism «was fin-
anced out of the resources of America and of a Castile which had itself received 
regular injections of silver from the silver-mines of the New World» ". 
Discovery of history's richest silver mine at Potosi (in present-day Bolivia) 
'n 1545 (in conjunction with other important mine discoveries in Perú and 
México) was an evcnt of far-reaching consequences for the Spanish Empire. By 
the time registered American treasure arrived on Spanish soil at Sevillc, the 
< r^own had already collected approximately 27.5 per cent of total production 
valué in taxes (foremost of which was the quinto, a 20 per cent severance tax 
on mining) ">. Mine operators could tolérate such heav\' Crown exactions dur-
'^  Sec Hlynn and Warnt-r (1991) for a modcl which connecis a fall in silvtr's valué in the bul-
lón market with price inflation emanating from the money market. 
" Elliott(1961), p. 62. 
'•' Kamen(1978), p. 41. 
" Klliott(1977), p. 291. 
"' Hamilton (1934), pp. 89-91; in a clear summary of sixtecnth-cenlury Spanish finances, 
í^tecle (1986, pp. 1511'52) states that the Kings poriion of treasure landing in Sevillc was actually 
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ing the early years of the mining boom because the market valué of silver was 
so high —relative to the cost of producing it— that large profíts were still 
possible for private-sector participants even after the Crown had skimmed 27.5 
per cent off the top. Figure 3 offers a conceptual picture of Crown and private 
profíts. At any point in time, silver's market price (P") was determined by inter-
section of silver's stock supply (S) and stock demand (D). Any excess of P" 
over silver's cost of production (COP") is economic profít per unit of silver, by 
defínition. The hope of obtaining a share of these profíts was the motivating 
factor, of course, for the conversión of desoíate, three-mile-high Potosi into 
one of history's most spectacular boomtowns. Although two-and-a-half-
months' distance by pack animal from Lima (a thousand miles), the population 
of Potosi rose from zero in 1545 to an estimated 160,000 by 1605, nearly the 
size of Paris or London *'. Since the Spanish Crown controlled the lion's sharc 
FIGURE 3 
Spantsh american silver profíts 
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Q,ii 
two-fifths (40 %l, considerably more than Hamilion's estímate of 27.5 %. Perhaps our conceptual 
example should use 40 % as the Crown take rather than 27.5 %, but intentional imprecisión 
underscores awareness of the abstract nature of our argument. 
" Vilar (1976, p. 131). For population figures for London, Paris, and every other major Euro-
pean city, see de Vries (1984, Appendix II. 
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of the prodigious silver profits, the Empire's expansión and maintenance were 
crucially dependent upen vigorous silver production. 
Too much attention has been paid to the quantity of silver entering Spain. 
The imponant thing was not so much the quantity of silver secured by the 
Spanish Crown, but its purchasing power. The statement that Spanish or Eu-
ropean prices —in silver-content terms— rose three-or four-fold during the 
«long» sixteenth century simply mcans that silver coins fell in valué to one-
third or one-fourth of their previous level. Comparing O o w n silver imports 
during the interval 1591-1595 with imports for the interval 1596-1600, for 
example. Hamilton found that O o w n silver imports increased by 9.5 per cent, 
rrom 10.023 million pesos to 10.974 million pesos. Since Spanish prices (in sil-
ver- content terms) simultaneously rose 12.85 per cent between these two peri-
ods, however, inflation-adjusted O o w n receipts fell by over 3 per cent ***. The 
Crown received roughly 10 per cent more silver, in other words, but each 
piecc of silver received had lost 13 per cent of its purchasing power. The 
Crown had collected almost a million more pesos in nominal terms during the 
1596-1600 interval, while the total purchasing power of that greater quantity 
Oí silver fell by more than a quarter of a million pesos ''*. 
Decline in the purchasing power of Crown silver continued into the first 
hall of the seventeenth century, at a time when the quantity of official, taxable 
silver imports also declined •*". Antonio Domínguez Ortiz reports that this was 
devastating in terms of the fiscal viability of the Royal Treasury "": 
Having mentionetl the violcnt causes for the dccreasc in the arrival ot 
precious metáis, wc shoukl makc referente to other causes whith are Icss appar-
cnt but more imponant betausc thcy are continuous and profound. One which 
is not usuaily mentioned, although it is among the most imponant, is the de-
cline in buying power of silver; the enormous amounts of this metal that had ar-
rived in Europe had satiated, to some extent, the tremcndous scarcily that at 
the beginning of the Modern Age had been felt in precious metáis. 
Mark Stcele has documented the systematic impact of silver's declining 
valué —otherwise known as silver-content price inflation— on the reduced 
purchasing power of Crown revenues. The famous ad-valorem (sales) tax, the 
i" '^^ '^  Hamilton (1934), p. 3-4 anü p. 403. 
•* Flynn (19821, p. 142. 
Decline in official, taxable silver imports does not necessarily imply that total silver im-
Ports declined. Smuggling of silver increased over time, a trend documented so heavily by Mori-
"eau (1981) and others that Kamen (1983, p. 293) calis it a «now established fact that bullion im-
P"ns rose in the later seventeenth century». 
Domínguez Ortiz (1960), p. 284. 
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alcabala, was converted to a fixed-payment encabezamiento in 1523; by 1534 
two-thirds of the tax was paid under this new system. Charles I was thereby 
stuck with fixed payments for a quarter-century during which time the general 
level of prices in Castile rose by 60 per cent ^^ . The «bankruptcy» of 1557 re-
sulted, an event which Steele regards as renegotiation of terms of the debt 
rather than a true bankruptcy. The second encabezamiento of 1560 —40 per 
cent higher than the first— can be viewed as a sort of médium- term solution 
to the problem of silver's falling valué, but again it remain fixed for many years 
while price inflation continued to eat away at Crown revenues. The third en-
cabezamiento was instituted in 1575, during a year of real fiscal bankruptcy, but 
that amount was chopped some 30 per cent in an agreement with the Cortes 
in 1577. Philip II's revenues from all sources did triple during the second half 
of the sixteenth century, while prices only doubled, but the costs of war conti-
nued to outstrip growth in revenue sources. The Crown's financia! dilemma 
continued well into (and worsened during) the seventeenth century •": 
To bridge the déficit caused by Habsburg imperialism the government was 
compelled to borrow on a grand scale. In 1557, at Philip II's accession, the Cas-
tiiian national debt stood at thirty-six million ducats; in 1598, when the king 
died, it stood at eighty-fivc million. Two years after Philip IV's accession, in 
1623, the total public debt had risen to 112 million ducats —equivalent of at 
least ten years' revenue; two years after his death, in 1667, the debt stood at 180 
million. This five-fold increase in a little over a century was caused in large 
measure by Spain's insistence on heavy military spending in the Low Countries: 
the periods of fastest increase in the debt corresponded with the periods of 
greatest cxpendlture in the Nctherlands. 
Even at the apex of the influx of American treasure (the 1590s), Crown ex-
penditures exceeded not only the Crown's portion of the American treasure 
importcd, but the total influx of treasure to Spain (both public and private) ^^. 
By the reign of Philip IV, «Castile's "crisis" and decadence appear to be not 
only (or not so much) the consequences of overtaxation, but also the corol-
laries of a political system whose social implications generated an administra-
tive apparatus incapable of dealing with the enormous costs of an empire 
much more difficult to defend than that of anv other state» •". 
'^ Steele (1986), pp. N6-47. 
•" Parker (1979), pp. 188-89; similar numbers for Crown debt can be found in Braudel (1972, 
vol. 1, p. 53). Castillo (1963, p. 52), and Koenigsberger (1958, p. 312). 
•'•' Vilar(197-4), p. 203. 
•" Yun(1994), p. 311. 
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Unavoidable structural difficulties plagued Spain's America-based econ-
omy. Decline in silver's market valué not only reduced Treasury purchasing 
power, it also led to the elimination of mine profits for the prívate sector. A re-
duction in silver's price from, say, P* to P** in Figure 4, other things equal, 
would reduce available per-unit profit. The Crown was intent to maintain its 
27.5 per cent share of registered silver output —even increasing it, if 
possible— but it is important to remember that 27.5 per cent of gross valué 
does not equal 27.5 per cent of total economic profit. The Crown's proportion 
of economic profit grew over time because available per-unit economic profit 
(ie. public and prívate combined) was shrinking. 
FIGURE 4 
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In other words, the Crown suffered because of the declining purchasing 
power of its silver receipts, but prívate operators were doubly suffering be-
cause their proportion of per-unit profit fell plus what they did get was falling 
'" purchasing power (just as it was for the Crown). 
At some point in time, the price of silver must have fallen to the point that 
't exceeded cost of production by precisely 27.5 per cent (then, later, by less 
than 27.5 per cent). When silver's price exceeded cost of production by pre-
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cisely 27.5 per cent, the Crown's 27.5 per cent in taxes (of gross valué) would 
have equalled 100 per cent of the economic profít yielded by the New World 
mining industry. With no residual profit left over for prívate operators, subse-
quent reduction in silver's price had to have forced private-sector participants 
to either smuggle (i.e. avoid Crown taxes) or cease mine activity. Increasingly 
rampant smuggling over time is «predicted» by our model. The archives and 
secondary literature are in fact full of anecdotal evidence suggesting increased 
smuggling over time, a practice which only exacerbated the Crown's financial 
nightmare. One example of the prevalence of smuggling in the seventeenth 
century is provided by Fiynn and Giráldez (1996a), who use estimates of the 
valúe ot Chínese silk swapped for American silver via the Manila Galleons in 
support ot the growth-in-smuggling hypothesis throughout the seventeenth 
century •"'. In response to (required) increase in smuggling, the Crown event-
ually reduced its own quinto (normally defined as a 20 per cent severance tax) 
to 10 per cent and sometimes less. 
In addition to silver's falling valué, rising mining costs also quickened the 
erosión of overall mining profits. Per-unit production costs rose as mines were 
deepened; deeper shafts were of course more susceptible to flooding, and my-
riad other production difficultics aróse as veins played out. Concerted (some-
times frantic) effort was devoted to implementation of new, cost-reducing pro-
duction technologics in American mines, .sometimes with spcctacular success; 
still, costs ultimately crept as rcadily available ore became more scarce over 
time '•'. Thus, both the Crown and private operators were caught in a double 
'" The volume of silk on Manila galleons hcadcd tor America supports Chuan's (1969) con-
tention that 2 million pesos wortti of silver iraverscd rhc Pacific throughout the I7lh century. 
Although lePaske (1983, p. -434) and Barrett (1990, p 2-49) respectively offer admittedly conser-
vaiivc estímales ol 517.000 and 660.000 pesos in q/Z/c/a/«/«'r passing over the Pacific annually 
during this period. both admit thai an unknowabit volume ol silver was smugglcd. «That the 
Philippines siphoned olí large sums o( silver Irom the New World cannot be denied, hut 
measuring its flow is virtually impossible.» (TePaske, 1983, p. -437) According to Cross (1983, p. 
4121, an averagc ol 2-3 million pesos (53,000 kg to 79,000 kg puré silver) was sent wilh official 
sanclion from Perú to México beiween 1580 and 1610; while Borah (1954, pp. 88, 123) argües 
that inclusión of the contraband tradc at that time raises the total to more than 100,000 kg an-
nually (i.e. more than 4 million pesos). Thcrc was no reason to ship silver Irom Pcru to México, 
other than to forward it on to Asia via the Manila galleons, so this constitutes additional evi-
dence that millions of pesos in silver flowed annually over the Pacific during the 17ih century. 
(Contraband silver aist) prevailed over the Atlantic routes during the seventeenth century. Ac-
cording to Moutoukias (1991, p. 339), undeclared treasure comprised two-thirds of the trade out 
ol Amcrica's «back door» down the Atlantic side of the Andes (1630-1640), rising to as much as 
90 % ol silver exports beiween 1650-1659. For a summary of smuggled American silver via a va-
rieiy of routes, sce FIynn and Giráldez (1996b, Section II). 
••' For dlscussion of the constant battie between rising mine production costs and costsaving 
innovarions, see Jara (1966) and Szaszdi (1975). 
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squeeze; product price fell and the cost of producing silver rose as time mar-
ched on (as depicted in Figure 5). The question was: When would price and 
cost converge? Fortunately for the Crown, the enormity of demand-side torces 
emanating from China postponed complete elimination of above-normal silver 
profits until somewhere around 1640. That is, even with the advantage of 
augmented Chínese demand, the decline in silver's world price continued (al-
beit at a reduced rate) until about 1640, having reduced both Crown purchas-
•ng power and overall mining profitability in the process. Figure 6, borrowed 
trom Richard von Glahn, summarizes the elimination of differences in bimetal-
hc ratios around the world by about 1640. 
It is interesting to note the years Adam Smith, an early proponent of a 
cost-of-production thinking about price inflation, felt represented the end of 
the Price Revolution: «Between 1630 and 1640, or about 1636, the effcct of 
the discovery of the mines of America in reducing the valué of silver, appears 
to have been completed, and the valué of that metal seems never to have sunk 
lower in proportion to that of corn than it was about that time» •"*. The de-
scent üt silver's price to its cost of production had eliminated mine profits; 
valué would not fall further until either fresh mine discoveries or implementa-
tion of new mining tcchnologies. Stabilization of silver's valué, in other words, 
"Tiplied the end of the Price Revolution. Stable and even deflationary (silver-
content) price levéis, in fact, characterized the last two-thirds of the seven-
'eenth century throughout the world. Our contention is that Imperial Spain's 
deepening financial crisis was connected to the protracted fall of silver's valué; 
American mine profits were slowly squeezed out, an inevitabiiity which was 
orestalled —but not eliminated— by the prodigious Chínese demand for sil-
ver. At the dawn of the seventeenth century, the Spanish Crown found itself in 
3n untenable financial position. On the cost side, global political and military 
expenses continued to rise in the face of climbing interest payments on a huge 
accumulated national debt. The Crown's struggle to service existing debt was 
certainly no secret to International bankers who were stung by repeated Haps-
"urg renegotiation, and sometimes repudiation, of debt. The Crown repeatedly 
n't its credit limit while the purchasing power of Crown revenues continued to 
all; m any case, a growing proportion of New World remittances had already 
been pledged by the Crown. The bankers who facilitated war finance, the 
«asentistas», were deeply affected by the scarcity of resources and many for-
tunes were lost. The silver carried by the fleets from 1638 through 1639, for 
example, was not enough to pay the asentistas and in 1640, «the gravest for 
Smith (1776), p. 192. 
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the Hispanic Monarchy», these bankers provided only 6,361 escudos, in con-
trast with requirements of 300,000 escudos per munth for troops in the Nether-
lands alone •". 
There were few remaining financial options by the beginning of the seven-
teenth centun'. The Crown either had to begin backing out of the empire busi-
ness, or increase pressure on ever)' potential revenue source within the Em-
pire. The latter option was chosen. Public assets were sold, prívate assets 
seized, and tax rates were raised to (and past) limits of toleration. These ac-
tions contributed to civil strife and eventually to civil wars. What we are sug-
gesting is that the loss of purchasing power from the Crown's American enter-
prise was inevitable; moreover, the state's well-documented relentless pressure 
for increased taxation within Castile and elsewhere within the Empire was 
mandatory —given global commitments— in order to compénsate for lost ex-
ternal purchasing power. The alternative was conscious surrender of empire, 
an apparently unacceptable alternative. 
IV. FINAL COLLAPSE UNDER PHILIP IV (1621-1665) 
According to Domínguez Ortiz, the hegemony of Spain in Europe lasted 
until 1618 and, although weakened, the Spanish Habsburgs did manage to re-
main a forcé with which to contend during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). 
Philip IV's (1621-1665) accession to power, however, coincided with the rene-
wal of an expensive war with the Dutch in 1621. Spain's financial problems 
date back to the sixteenth century, as Steele (1986) demonstrares, but the Em-
pire's final debacle began in 1621 with the expiration of the Twelve Years 
Iruce. Relentless fiscal pressure to finance renewed war ruined the Castilian 
economy and was a powerful contributor to political turmoil throughout the 
Empire. 
The army of Flanders' annual expenditures had been running about 1.5 
million ducats prior to expiration of the Truce, but these expenses quickly 
rose to 3.5 million ducats at the beginning of hostilities in 1621: «Bringing the 
total expenditure for the year to well over 8,000,000 ducats '"». These addi-
tional costs were disastrous for Crown finances. Expenditures for 1622 rose to 
an estimated 9,161,845 ducats, but even the assembly of all possible sources 
enabled the Council of Finance to raise only 2,296,500 ducats revenue up to 
Domínguez Ortiz (1977), p 386. 
Elliott(1970), p. 459. 
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1626 [not counting silver from America belonging to merchants and bankers, 
ñor the «millones» already assigned for particular expenditures] ' '. Confront-
ing this dismaying situation, Olivares wrote a memorándum to the King in 
which he outlined a plan to unify various territories of the Spanish monarchy 
into a single administrative unit, the famous «Union de Armas» promulgated 
as a decree in 1626. Behind this administrative reform was the pressing need 
to collect higher taxes from territories of the Empire in order to finance the 
war in Europe. Aragón and Valencia reluctantly accepted the requirements, 
but the Catalans refused to increase their contribution. The meeting of the 
1626 Cortes was a failure and the assembly was adjourned in 1632 without 
any success for the central government. 
The Dutch confrontation was global. Vast sums were sent to fortresses and 
outposts in the Caribbean, with even heavier sums remitted to the Philippines 
and the Moluccas. According to a Dutch source in 1630, the annual cost of 
Spanish dcfcnse in the East Indics was equivalent to 5,000,000 guilders ^^ . Ex-
penditures for distant fortresses and flcets obviously diverted remittances 
which otherwisc could have helped finance the war in the Low Countries. 
This diversión increased pressure for fiscal contributions from Flanders, Portu-
gal, and alsü Spanish America. Hapsburg Italy was an important financia! 
source as well, but «the new resources of Spanish Italy [9.2 million ducats be-
tween 1631 and 1643] could not compénsate for the fall in the financial power 
of Castile» ". In other words, despite partial success in spreading taxes more 
uniformly throughout the Empire, Castile was left to shoulder the main finan-
cial burden itself 
The war with France in 1635 and the conflicts in Portugal and Catalonia 
exacerbated an already critical situation. The solution to this predicament was 
to increase direct domestic taxes. The Cortes were pressured for larger con-
tributions. Duties on foodstuffs, the «millones», were raised. New fiscal de-
vices were implemented: There was a tax on salt, another on the sale of paper, 
and the «media anata» allowed the Crown to retain half of new appointees' in-
come during the first year. The nobility and clergy were under relentless press-
ure to grant loans and give gifts, «donativos». «Hidalgos» served in the army at 
their own expense and the high nobility was expected to maintain companies 
of infantry. Offices of the crown, rents, titles and villages were sold and royal 
pardons were granted to crimináis in exchange for payment. In 1635 the 
Crown «confiscated half the yicld of all juros held by natives, and the entire 
'I Domínguez Ortiz (1%Ü), p. 16. 
" Israelll982), p. 295. 
••' Parker (1972), p. 157. 
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yield of those belonging to foreigners —a device imitated in whole or in pan 
almost evcn' year thereafter» '•*. 
The disorder caused by the war with France in 1635 prompted rebellion 
in Barcelona, which was supported by Cardinal Richelieu. The Crown's fiscal 
pressure on Portugal, coupled with the Dutch attacks on the Portuguese Em-
pire, were the causes of Portugal's drive for independence, an event immedi-
ately supported by the French and the English. The Portuguese peace treaty 
with the Dutch in 1641 resulted from Portugal's desire to maintain their cm-
pire in Brazil and África. 
The financial pressures of these external wars were exacerbated by an 
array of costly conflicts and rebellions within the Empire's own territories. The 
year 1640 brought the Catalán revolt and the independence of Portugal. A 
conspiracy by the Duke of Medina Sidonia and the Marquis of Ayamonte to 
sepárate Andalusia from the Crown followed in 1641. Numerous popular up-
risings prompted by rising prices for foodstuffs and higher taxes occurred in 
Vizcaya (1632), Evora (1637), and Naples and Sicily (1647). External conflict 
and internal disintegration signalled the dramatic twilight of the Empire: 
«From the end of 1640 Spain and Spain's international power were visibly 
crumbling» ". The territorial arrangements after the Thirty Years War ac-
knowledged the demise of Imperial Spain. The King of Spain accepted the 
Netherlands' independence in the treaty of Munster in 1648. The Peace of 
Westphalia sealed the defeat of the Habsburgs of Vienna and Madrid; a new 
European map was drawn based on independen! states: «Until the days of the 
French Revolution, the Peace of Westphalia was considered to be the basis of 
the European state system» '*'. The ceding of Artois, Rousilion and part of Cer-
dagne to France in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 reflected continuation 
of Spanish imperial disintegration. Finally, the independence of Portugal was 
formalized in the treaty of Lisbon in 1668, during the minority of Charles II. 
Another means by which to increase Crown revenue was manipulation of 
«vellón», the copper coins issued since 1603 by Philip III. Seigniorage rates for 
petty coins reached as high as 91 per cent ". Coinage and recoinage of copper 
was a desperate measure and yielded a benefit of 13,152,000 ducats in the first 
six years, while the recoinage of 1636 yielded 4,700,000 ducats, compared with 
10,000,000 ducats in 1641, 6,000,000 ducats in 1643, and 11,000,000 ducats in 
Ellioit(1970), p.-165. 
Eliiott(1970l, p. 470. 
Beller(197ü), p. 358. 
Motomiira(1994), p. 118. 
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1651 '*. These are significant revenues compared with the Kings average con-
signment of only 1,000,000 ducats from galleons arriving in Seville. A more-de-
tailed recent study of Castilian seigniorage corroborares the general picture 
painted by Domínguez Ortiz: «After 1626, the petty money stock fluctuated 
with military spending.... The petty currency did not stabilize until two decades 
of peace after 1680 eased the fiscal pressures on the Monarchy» ". By this 
time, there had been State bankruptcies in 1627, 1647, 1656, and 1664. The 
Crown had exhausted every avenue to continué financing the Empire, but to 
no avail. There simply was no substitute for dwindling New World profits. 
Having benefitted from neither an agricultura! revolution ñor a transformation 
of the manufacturing sector, Empire financing was largely dependent upon 
American mines. Elimination of mine profits contributed mightily to the de-
cline of Spain. Both were inevitable. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis of this essay is that events within Ming China had a fundamen-
tal impact on the rise and decline of the Spanish Empire. A crucial aspect of 
the tremendous surge in global trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies was that one particular product —silver— was the dominant export out 
of the West and (for a time) out of Japan. Tens of thousands of tons of silver 
migrated to China because silver was worth up to rwice as much there relative 
to the rest of the world. 
A comprehensive analysis of the fiscal basis of the Spanish Empire re-
quires inclusión of the silverization of China. Spanish America silver mines 
were the richest in world history; in other words, they were enormously profit-
able. The Crown was successful in procuring the lion's share of silver-industry 
profits, but prodigious production rates led to a gradual decline in silver's mar-
ket valué. The decline of per-unit profít was inevitable. Our counter-factual 
claim is that silver profits would have probably vanished within a decade or 
two —had it not been for the vast and expanding Chínese demand for silver. 
But Chínese demand for silver did expand dramatically, which in turn con-
tributed to silverization of her entire tributary system. The fact that silver lost 
valué around the globe so gradually, in other words, is attributable to this con-
versión of a third or more of world population (i.e. China and its tributary 
'» Domínguez Ortiz (1960), pp. 272-73. 
" Motomura(1994),pp. 11819. 
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States, not to mention India) to the use of silver for monetary and fiscal pur-
poses. Methodical reduction in silver's market valué, in turn, implied gradual 
price inflation (in siiver-content terms) around the world, but more important 
is the implication that enormous profits were thereby transferred to the Span-
ish Crown (and to the Shogun) from the sixteenth century up to about 1640. 
We would go so far as to say that Spain's extensive Empire would have been 
impossible in the absence of events emanating from within Ming China (just as 
Saudi Arabia today could not maintain its economic power in the absence of 
oil-demand emanating from a petroleum-based world industrial structure). 
We have focused on silver's inevitable profit squeeze because it helps tie 
together two long-recognized trends in Spanish historiography: (1) The Treas-
ury's fixation with increasingly onerous taxation in the face of enormous resist-
ance, and (2) evidence that international smuggling became increasingly preval-
ent over time. Declining purchasing power from American- based taxes left the 
Crown no alternative but to increase the squeeze on domestic citizens; after 
the far-flung Empire had reached its zenith, the enterprise either had to be 
supported financially or down-sized significantly. As for smuggling, once the 
Crown tried to take virtually all of the available economic profit from the min-
ing industry, private participants were forced to choose between tax-avoiding 
smuggling or cessation of activities. Understandably they chose to smuggle, 
which itself further reduced tax revenues and exacerbated the Crown's finan-
cial dilemma. 
It is useful to keep in mind the distinction between the silver trade's pre-
1640 «arbitrage phase» versus its post-1640 «non-arbitrage phase». This dis-
tmction helps reduce confusión when confronting such things as the mounting 
evidence that seventeenth-century silver production/exports were consider-
ably larger than previously realized ''". Again, we need to think in terms of in-
dustry profits as opposed to quantities per se. Spanish American exports of sil-
ver appear to have been relatively robust after 1640 —with no decline at all 
visible via the direct Pacific route— but the point is that extraordinary profits 
had already been squeezed out. American silver continued to gravitate toward 
China after 1640 because Japanese mines began to play out, but more import-
"' According to the conveniional view of Earl J. Hamilion (193-4), arrivals of silver to Seville 
peakcd during the late sixteenth century, followed by precipitous decline during the scventeenth 
centuri,'. The research of Michel Morineau (1985, Chapters 1 and 3) contradicts Hamilton's fínd-
ings with the claim that a steady flow of silver arrived in Spain during the seventeenth century. 
According to the survey article of Barrett (1990, p. 225), overall silver production in seventeenth-
century America exceeded that of the sixteenth century, findings which are consislcnt with the 
growing literaturc which documents the increasing prevalence of contraband silver during the 
seventeenth century. 
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antly because normal profits were sufficient to induce shipments into an ex-
panding market. This later period contrasts sharply with the explosive pre-
1640 arbitrage phase, characterized by above-normal profits and the associated 
trade frenzy which accompanied the opening of global trade opportunities. 
Normal post-1640 profits were not sui¥Ícient, however, to continué to finance 
an aberration on the scale of the Spanish Empire. 
The years around 1640 seem to have been critical in many parts of the 
worid. Could seemingly-disconnected events around the world have been 
linked globally via the silver trade? Not only was the Spanish Empire a sham-
bles by this date, but reduction in profits negatively impacted the American 
colonics as well as those regions of Europe most closely connected to the Em-
pire via commerce and finance. Japan was the world's second-largest silver 
producer in the early-modern period —selling, of course, to China as well. We 
believe that the timing of the so— called «ciosure» of Japan in the mid-1630s 
is not coincidental. The Shogun's silver profits declined for the same reasons 
as did those of Spanish America, but Japan enjoyed gold and copper booms as 
replacements, and in any case Japan was a more developed country than was 
Spain'''. 
Goldstone has proposed the interesting hypothesis that the Ming and the 
Ottomans suffered from essentially similar fiscal crises up to and around 1640; 
taxes in each case were fixed in terms of silver receipts, while both govern-
ments had experienced escalating expenses for some time (because of silver-
content price inflation) " . Evaluation of the Ottoman case is best left for ex-
perts in Middle Eastern history, but we do fínd plausible Goldstone's 
contention that fixed Ming silver receipts (in conjunction with silver-content 
price inflation) may have contributed to Qing overthrow of the Ming in 
1644 " . 
This essay raises many contentious issues, but one thing about which we 
are confident is that attempts to unravel the multi-faceted complexity sur-
rounding the rise and decline of the Spanish Empire should approach from a 
global perspective. The global silver trade provides a useful vantage. The physi-
cal penetration of Europeans into Asia has understandably prompted scholars 
to emphasize the impact of the West on Asian history. Economic mechanisms 
sometimes hide below the visible surface, however, and we believe that 
China's economic impact on Europe was far greater than all combined West-
ern economic impacts on Asia during this period. Perhaps no European state 
For a comparison between Imperial Spain and the Tokugawa Shogunate, see FIynn (1991). 
Goldstone (1991, chapter 4). 
Flvnn and Giráldez (1995bl, scction IV. 
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was as heavily influenced by developments within Ming China as was Imperial 
Spain. 
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